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WHAT’S IN A NAME:  THE BATTLE OVER A 
UNIFORM FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS 
ANDREW MELNICK† 
For generations, investors had clear choices when seeking 
assistance in investing their money.  Investment advisers 
provided financial advice, either by exercising discretionary 
trading authority or providing financial planning, in exchange for 
a fee, typically based on the asset value of the account.  Broker-
dealers provided execution services for clients who wished to 
trade, occasionally made recommendations to customers on 
which they could choose to act or not act, and were compensated 
by commissions generated on transactions in the account.  
Investment advisers were regulated by the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 and had clear fiduciary duties.  Brokers under the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (“FINRA”) regulatory 
scheme did not have generalized fiduciary duties to their 
customers, but when making recommendations to customers, 
they had to act “fairly” and have a “reasonable basis” for making 
such recommendations. 
The lines have blurred considerably over the past decades as 
broker-dealers expanded their offerings of products and services.  
Brokers—“registered representatives” with FINRA—now carry 
titles such as “Financial Adviser” or “Investment Consultant” 
and may have designations such as “Certified Financial Planner” 
and “Retirement Planning Specialist.”  They may now also 
charge a fee in a brokerage account.  Broker-dealers themselves 
offer an array of advisory services and programs in which 
registered representatives, portfolio managers, or others within 
the firm act in an advisory capacity. 
 
† Partner, Schindler Cohen & Hochman LLP in New York. The author would 
like to thank Francesca Celestre, Esq., his colleague at Schindler Cohen & Hochman 
LLP, for her invaluable insights and assistance in preparing this Article. 
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Multiple studies have shown that investors, while benefiting 
from having the choice of working with an investment adviser or 
broker, are confused by the differences between the two and are 
not familiar with the differences in the standard of care between 
them.1  FINRA Rule 2111, the suitability standard for broker-
dealers, requires that a FINRA member have a “reasonable 
basis” to believe that a recommended transaction or strategy is 
suitable for the customer based on the customer’s investment 
profile.2  Some commentators posit that the suitability standard 
of conduct fails to adequately protect investors.3  Advocates and 
participants in securities litigations, arbitrations, and regulatory 
enforcement proceedings have spent hundreds of thousands of 
hours arguing over whether a particular registered 
representative and his or her firm owed a fiduciary duty to a 
particular client, and if so, what duties exactly were owed to the 
client as a result of this status. 
Congress sought to address the issue of the proper standard 
of care applicable to investment advisers and broker-dealers in 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”),4 which, among 
other things, required the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the “SEC”) to conduct a study to evaluate “the effectiveness of 
existing legal or regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers, 
[and] investment advisers.”5  Specifically, Dodd-Frank amends 
section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”) to permit the SEC to  
promulgate rules to provide that, with respect to a broker or 
dealer, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to a retail customer . . . the standard of conduct for  
 
 
 
 
1 See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 112 
(2008). 
2 FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859&print=1. 
3 David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES.COM (June 24, 2009, 
6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelli 
gent-investing-brokers.html. 
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-03, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824–25 (2010). 
5 Id. 
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such broker or dealer with respect to such customer shall be the 
same as the standard of conduct applicable to an investment 
adviser . . . .6 
On January 21, 2011, the SEC staff released its Dodd-Frank-
mandated Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (the 
“SEC Staff Study” or “Study”).7  In the Study, consistent with its 
legislative mandate, the SEC staff recommended rulemaking to 
establish a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers 
and broker-dealers that is “no less stringent” than the fiduciary 
standard applicable to investment advisers under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).8  Specifically, the Staff 
recommended that 
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the 
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best 
interest of the customer without regard to the financial or other 
interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing 
the advice.9 
The SEC Staff Study was issued in January 2011.10  
Although former SEC Chairman Schapiro stated that such 
rulemaking is “a priority” and there have been congressional 
hearings, no rules have been issued. 11  In the interim, a general 
consensus among industry participants and observers has 
emerged, perhaps recognizing the inevitability of the imposition 
of a uniform standard, in support of the concept of a uniform 
fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers.12  
The Securities Industry Financial Markets Association 
(“SIFMA”) lent its support to the concept of a uniform standard.13  
 
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 
Stat. at 1828 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012)). 
7 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS (2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
8 Id. at v–vi. 
9 Id. at 109–10. 
10 See generally id. 
11 Jesse Hamilton & Margaret Collins, Tougher Dodd-Frank Fiduciary 
Standard for Brokers Stalled, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:48 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-10/tougher-dodd-frank-fiduciary-standard-
for-u-s-brokers-stalled.html. 
12 Id. 
13 SIFMA Statement on SEC Fiduciary Duty Study, SIFMA (Jan. 22, 2011), 
http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=23128. 
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A coalition of the Consumer Federation of America, AARP, and 
others has also publicly stated support.14  Prominent academics 
and industry observers have voiced support for such a standard, 
citing concerns that “investors will be sold inappropriate 
products or [be] overcharged without the rule.”15 
What these broad statements of support for a uniform 
standard mask are the fierce differences in the competing visions 
of what precisely that uniform fiduciary standard should look 
like and how it should be implemented.  While the SEC staff 
should be praised for their exhaustive and thoughtful analysis of 
the regulatory framework of investment advisers and broker-
dealers, many of the recommendations in the SEC Staff Study 
are vague and need substantial clarification as part of the final 
rulemaking process.  As these interested industry groups and 
individuals recognize, the devil is in the details.  Simply 
imposing a “fiduciary” standard taken from, or based on, the 
Advisers Act—effectively labeling broker-dealers as fiduciaries 
under that regulatory regime—is both detrimental to the broker-
dealer model and inconsistent with the SEC’s mandate under 
Dodd-Frank. 
The imposition of a uniform fiduciary standard covering 
broker-dealers has the potential to upend decades of case law and 
regulatory precedent regarding the existence of, and more 
importantly, the scope of a broker-dealer’s fiduciary duty.  The 
SEC and FINRA have long refrained from imposing a blanket 
fiduciary standard upon broker-dealers, instead following a 
transaction-based approach discussed in more detail in Part I.B 
below.16  Courts have recognized that a broker-dealer does not 
owe fiduciary duties to its customers absent the existence of 
specific circumstances, such as the exercise of discretionary 
trading authority.17  Broker-dealers have developed sophisticated 
supervisory and compliance regimes designed to help brokers 
 
14 See Letter from the Consumer Fed’n of Am. et al. to Mary L. Schapiro, 
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter CFA Letter], 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/SIFMA-FrameworkResponse3-29-12.pdf. 
15 Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11. 
16 See infra Part I.B. 
17 See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics 
and Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 484 (2003). 
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meet their suitability obligations and protect investors.18  
Registered representatives have been trained and tested, for 
example through the Series 7 licensing exam, on their suitability 
obligations.19  The SEC’s final rules need to be clear and precise 
and need to provide ample illustrative guidance on the contours 
of any uniform fiduciary standard that will be applied to broker-
dealers.  In short, being labeled a “fiduciary” subject to a uniform 
fiduciary standard of care is just the start of the process. 
This Article briefly traces the content and sources of the 
standards governing the conduct of investment advisers and 
broker-dealers.  This Article then summarizes the key elements 
and recommendations of Dodd-Frank and the SEC Staff Study, 
and describes the competing visions offered by SIFMA and the 
Consumer Federation of America coalition in their respective 
letters to the SEC.  This Article concludes with a few 
observations about particular areas—specifically on the meaning 
of “personalized investment advice” and the provision of ongoing 
advice and the duty to monitor—that the SEC should consider 
providing detailed guidance on.  Depending on the final rules 
formulated by the SEC, the imposition of a uniform fiduciary 
standard applicable to broker-dealers can represent a sea change 
in how broker-dealers conduct their business, requiring an 
overhaul of the current model and a massive investment in 
technology, personnel, and training; or it can represent an 
incremental change, one that enhances investor protection and 
reduces investor confusion while allowing the broker-dealer 
model to continue to offer investors a wide array of choices of 
services and products at a range of pricing options. 
 
18 See Graham Ravdin, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Arguing for a 
Transatlantic Investor Protection Regime, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 490, 498 
(2012). 
19 See Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A Federal Remedy for 
Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 101, 111–12 (2006); 
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should 
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 137 (2010). 
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I. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 
A. Registered Investment Advisers: The Fiduciary Standard 
Under the Advisers Act section 202(a)(11), an investment 
adviser is: 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.20 
The SEC staff has generally concluded that a person is an 
investment adviser if that person: (i) provides advice, or issues 
reports or analyses, regarding securities; (ii) is in the business of 
providing such services; and (iii) receives compensation for such 
services.21  “Many money managers, investment consultants, and 
financial planners are regulated as ‘investment advisers’ under 
the Advisers Act or similar state statutes.”22  Excluded from the 
definition of “investment adviser” under the Act are broker-
dealers (i) whose performance of investment advisory services is 
“solely incidental” to the conduct of its business as a broker-
dealer and (ii) who receive no “special compensation” for their 
advisory services.23 
Under the Advisers Act, investment advisers are fiduciaries 
to their clients.24  An investment adviser is duty-bound to serve 
the best interests of its clients, including an obligation to act 
solely in the client’s best interests and thus subordinate its own 
interests to those of its clients.25  This duty of loyalty requires an 
investment adviser that has a material conflict of interest to 
 
20 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
21 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15; see Applicability of the 
Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other 
Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other 
Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 39 SEC Docket 494, 
1987 WL 112702, at *3 (Oct. 8, 1987). 
22 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15. 
23 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(C). 
24 See id. § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963). 
25 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 22. 
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either eliminate that conflict or fully disclose to the customer all 
material facts relating to the conflict and obtain his or her 
written consent.26  With respect to compensation, investment 
advisers typically charge an asset-based fee, thereby avoiding the 
incentive to execute trades that might not be in the client’s best 
interest.27  Further to this duty to eliminate or disclose material 
conflicts of interest, the Advisers Act explicitly prohibits an 
adviser, when acting as a principal for its own account, from 
effecting any sale or purchase of any security for the account of a 
client without first disclosing certain information to the client in 
writing and obtaining the client’s consent.28 
The duty of care ascribed to an investment adviser requires 
it to “make a reasonable investigation to determine that it is not 
basing its recommendations on materially inaccurate or 
incomplete information.”29  The Advisers Act demonstrates “a 
congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all 
conflicts of interest which might incline as [sic] investment 
adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which 
was not disinterested.”30  Thus, in practice, “the Advisers Act 
establishes a statutory fiduciary duty for investment advisers to 
act for the benefit of their clients, requiring advisers to exercise 
the utmost good faith in dealing with clients, to disclose all 
material facts, and to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading 
clients.”31 
B. Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Standard 
A “broker” is defined by the Exchange Act as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for 
the account of others.”32  A “dealer” is similarly defined as “any 
person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or 
 
26 Id. at 22, 26. 
27 See id. at 41–42. 
28 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3); U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 25. 
29 Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 3052, 98 SEC Docket 3027, 2010 WL 2779423, at *52 (July 14, 2010); U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 22. 
30 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963). 
31 SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867, 895–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
FINAL_MELNICK 2/27/2014  6:22 PM 
422 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:415   
otherwise.”33  Broker-dealers must generally register with the 
SEC and are required to become members of at least one self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”), such as FINRA.34  Unless 
broker-dealers charge separately for their advice, they are 
excluded from the definition of “investment adviser” and are not 
subjected to a fiduciary standard.35  Broker-dealers traditionally 
receive transaction-based compensation, for example, in the form 
of commissions.36 
Pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws 
and SRO rules—including FINRA Rule 2010, which relates to the 
“just and equitable principles of trade”—broker-dealers are 
required to deal fairly with customers.37  However, the federal 
securities laws, SEC rules, and SRO regulations do not impose a 
blanket fiduciary duty upon broker-dealers in dealing with their 
customers.38  Rather, courts have generally held that broker-
dealers, absent the exercise of discretionary trading authority or 
control over customer assets—the hallmark of a non-
discretionary account—or the existence of a relationship of trust 
and confidence with a customer, do not owe customers a fiduciary 
duty.39  Thus, in the typical non-discretionary brokerage account, 
absent special factors and circumstances, a broker-dealer does 
not owe its customer a fiduciary duty.40  Rather, the duty is 
 
33 Id. § 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
34 Id. § 15(a)(1), (b)(11)(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1), (b)(11)(a)(i); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15b9-1 (2013). 
35 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(c) (2012); Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an 
Honor: The Best Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291, 299 n.44 
(2012). 
36 See Cable, supra note 19, at 139. 
37 FINRA Rule 2010, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
content.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504; see Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional 
Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 
U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 540–41, 546–47 (2002). 
38 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 35, at 305 (discussing the Merrill Lynch Rule 
which was designed “to exempt broker-dealers from fiduciary duties”). 
39 See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1308–09 (2d Cir. 
2002); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Although the existence of fiduciary relationships under New York 
law cannot be determined by recourse to rigid formulas, New York courts typically 
focus on whether one person has reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby 
gains a resulting superiority or influence over the first.”), rev’d, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
40 See Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), 
aff’d, 157 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. 
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limited to the specific matter entrusted to the broker-dealer—
namely, the “narrow task of consummating the transaction 
requested.”41 
Moreover, it is well-settled that a broker ordinarily does not 
have a duty to give ongoing advice in between transactions in a 
non-discretionary account, even if the broker had volunteered 
such advice on previous occasions.42  As the Second Circuit held 
in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co.: 
  It is uncontested that a broker ordinarily has no duty to 
monitor a nondiscretionary account, or to give advice to such a 
customer on an ongoing basis.  The broker’s duties ordinarily 
end after each transaction is done, and thus do not include a 
duty to offer unsolicited information, advice, or warnings 
concerning the customer’s investments.  A nondiscretionary 
customer by definition keeps control over the account and has 
full responsibility for trading decisions.  On a transaction-by-
transaction basis, the broker owes duties of diligence and 
competence in executing the client’s trade orders, and is obliged 
to give honest and complete information when recommending a 
purchase or sale.  The client may enjoy the broker’s advice and 
recommendations with respect to a given trade, but has no legal 
claim on the broker’s ongoing attention.43 
 
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding no 
continuing fiduciary relationship existed where the customer had a non-
discretionary account with broker); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 952–53 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding that broker owed only 
limited, transactional duties to customer who maintained non-discretionary 
account), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). 
41 Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999). 
42 See De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1302. 
43 Id.; see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 2d 
257, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A broker or dealer that lacks discretionary control over 
investment decision usually has no duty of care that extends beyond the execution of 
transactions.”); DeBlasio v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 07 Civ. 318(RJS), 2009 WL 
2242605, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (“[T]he Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 
cases such as Kwiatkowski do not demonstrate as a matter of law that every 
brokerage relationship lacks fiduciary characteristics, Plaintiffs have not alleged 
facts or circumstances that, if proven, would establish that the Brokerage 
Defendants breached the limited duties that they owed to Plaintiffs in regard to 
their brokerage accounts.”); Welch v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 07 Civ. 
6904(RJS), 2009 WL 2356131, at *43 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (“Brokerage 
Defendants were not required to notify Plaintiffs of opportunities to improve their 
earnings on uninvested funds.”); Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 113 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (“[A]bsent an express investment 
advisory contract there is no fiduciary duty [to monitor] unless the customer is 
infirm or ignorant of business affairs.”), aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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But broker-dealers remain subject to a suitability obligation, 
which generally requires a broker-dealer to make 
recommendations that the broker reasonably believes are 
suitable for the client.44  Thus, new FINRA Rule 2111 requires 
that a broker-dealer and registered representative “have a 
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or 
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable 
for the customer, based on the information obtained through the 
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to 
ascertain the customer’s investment profile.”45  As described in 
FINRA’s guidance in connection with issuance of the new 
suitability rule, there are three main obligations comprising a 
broker-dealer’s suitability obligation: (i) reasonable-basis 
suitability; (ii) customer-specific suitability; and (iii) quantitative 
suitability.46  For reasonable-basis suitability, the broker-dealer 
must have a reasonable basis, based on reasonable diligence, to 
believe that the recommendation is suitable for at least some 
investors.47  FINRA guidance makes clear that the scope and 
breadth of “reasonable diligence” is dependent upon the 
complexity and risks associated with the security or strategy and 
the member firm’s familiarity with the security or investment 
strategy.48  The customer-specific obligation requires that the 
member firm have a reasonable basis to believe that the 
recommendation is suitable for the particular customer based on 
the customer-specific information obtained by the member firm.49  
The third component, quantitative suitability, evaluates whether 
a broker-dealer who has actual or de facto control over a 
customer account has a reasonable basis for believing that a 
series of recommendations is suitable and not excessive in light 
of the customer’s investment profile.50 
 
44 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25: Know Your Customer and Suitablity 2 
(2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/ 
documents/notices/p123701.pdf; FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra. 
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 
(replacing NASD Rule 2230 with FINRA Rule 2111). 
45 FINRA Rule 2111. 
46 See id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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A broker-dealer’s suitability obligation is largely transaction-
based and is keyed to a recommendation.51  Absent a 
recommendation, under the FINRA rules, a broker-dealer has no 
suitability obligation.52  There is no ongoing duty to monitor the 
account or provide advice between transactions.53  This principle 
was affirmed in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co. and more 
recent cases.54 
II. THE SEC’S STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS  
AND BROKER-DEALERS 
The SEC Staff Study starts from the premise that retail 
investors are often confused about the roles played by investment 
advisers and broker-dealers and are not familiar with the 
standard of care that applies to their dealings with them.55  At 
the same time, investors wanted to preserve their investment 
choices and maintain access to the fee structures and services 
offered by both investment advisers and broker-dealers.56 
The SEC Staff Study, after an exhaustive discussion of the 
regulatory framework applicable to broker-dealers and 
investment advisers, recommends that the SEC establish a 
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers; this standard should be “no less 
stringent” than currently applied under sections 206(1) and (2) of 
the Advisers Act,57 which require an adviser to eliminate, or at 
least disclose, all material conflicts of interest.58  More 
specifically, the SEC Staff Study recommends adopting a uniform 
fiduciary standard that requires investment advisers and broker-
dealers, when providing such personalized investment advice 
about securities to retail customers, to “act in the best interest of 
 
51 See id. 
52 See id.; see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 
2d 257, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
53 See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
54 See id.; see also In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 
375, 387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Anschutz Corp. v. Merril Lynch & Co., 
690 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012). 
55 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 101. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at v–vi. 
58 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012). 
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the customer without regard to the financial or other interest of 
the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.”59  
The SEC Staff Study further recommends that the SEC consider 
harmonizing laws and regulations to provide protection to retail 
investors who receive the same or substantially similar services 
from investments advisers and broker-dealers.60 
The broad outline of the proposed uniform fiduciary standard 
set out by the SEC staff contains a duty of loyalty and a duty of 
care.61  The SEC Staff Study notes that the duty of loyalty under 
the Advisers Act prohibits an adviser from putting its own 
interests ahead of its clients’ and requires broker-dealers to 
disclose or eliminate material conflicts of interest.62  However, 
consistent with section 913 of Dodd-Frank, the SEC Staff Study 
explains that the receipt of commissions or other transaction-
based compensation for the sale of securities does not, in and of 
itself, necessarily violate the duty of loyalty component of the 
proposed uniform fiduciary standard.63 
The Staff recommended that the SEC promulgate rules to 
facilitate “uniform, simple and clear disclosures to retail 
[investors] about the terms of their relationships with broker-
dealers and investment advisers.”64  These disclosures would be 
similar to the Form ADV that investment advisers are required 
to provide at the outset of the relationship and would include 
more specific disclosures at the time that personalized 
investment advice is provided.65 
Under the Staff’s proposal, a broker or adviser would be held 
to minimum standards of review and analysis when providing 
personalized investment advice to retail investors.66  The Staff 
 
59 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 109. The study explicitly rejects 
two other approaches that section 913 of Dodd-Frank required the SEC to consider: 
eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of “investment adviser” 
under the Advisers Act and applying the duty of care and other requirements of the 
Advisers Act to broker-dealers. Id. at 139–40. 
60 See id. at 129. 
61 See id. at 112, 120. 
62 Id. at 112–13; Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 3060, 98 SEC Docket 3502, 2010 WL 2957506, at *2 (Aug. 12, 2010). 
63 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 113; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1828–29 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 80b-11(g) (2012)). 
64 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 117. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 122. 
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recognized the need for sufficient flexibility to cover a large and 
dynamic marketplace.67  As the Staff noted, “Minimum baseline 
professionalism standards could include, for example, specifying 
what basis a broker-dealer or investment adviser should have in 
making a recommendation to a retail customer.”68 
The SEC Staff Study also recommends that the SEC adopt 
guidance to define what it means to provide “personalized 
investment advice.”69  At a minimum, the Study recommends 
that the definition should encompass the making of a 
“recommendation” as that concept has developed under 
applicable broker-dealer regulation70 and should not include 
“impersonal investment advice” as defined under the Advisers 
Act.71 
The SEC Staff Study recognizes that whether a 
recommendation has been made is an intensely fact-specific 
inquiry, generally dependent upon the content, context, and 
presentation of a particular set of communications.72  Generally, 
an important consideration is whether the communication—
given its content, context, and manner of presentation—
reasonably would be viewed as a “call to action” or a suggestion 
that the customer engage in a particular transaction.73  The SEC 
Staff Study provided the following as a non-exhaustive list of 
communications generally viewed as constituting a 
recommendation: (1) customer-specific communications to a 
targeted customer or group of customers encouraging a 
transaction in a particular security or a particular strategy; 
(2) communications stating that customers should invest in a 
particular sector and providing a “recommended” list or “buy” list 
of stocks; (3) portfolio analysis tools that generate a specific list  
 
 
 
67 Id. at 123. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 127. 
70 Id.; FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859. 
71 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 127. 
72 Id. at 124; NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-23, 
ONLINE SUITABILITY: SUITABILITY RULE AND ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS 2 (2001), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/ 
notices/p003887.pdf. 
73 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 124. 
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of “buy” or “sell” recommendations based on customer-specific 
information; (4) securities that are bought, sold, or traded in a 
discretionary account.74 
Similarly, the SEC Staff Study lists certain activities that 
fall outside the definition of a “recommendation”: 
General financial and investment information such as (i) basic 
investment concepts, such as risk and return, diversification, 
dollar cost averaging, compounded return, and tax deferred 
investment, (ii) historic differences in the return of asset 
classes . . . (iii) effects of inflation, (iv) estimates of future 
retirement income needs, and (v) assessment of a customer’s 
investment profile;75 
Descriptive information about an employer-sponsored 
retirement or benefit plan . . . and the investment options 
[thereunder];76 
Asset allocation models that: (i) are based on generally accepted 
investment theory; (ii) be accompanied by disclosures of all 
material facts and assumptions that may affect a reasonable 
investor’s assessment of the . . . model . . . and (iii) comply with 
applicable FINRA interpretive material allowing investment 
analysis tools.77 
While the SEC has been drafting a rule for nearly two years, 
no action on the measure is currently scheduled.78  The SEC has 
held conferences and met with various interested parties 
regarding the proposed changes, and Congressional hearings 
have discussed the uniform fiduciary duty.79  The SEC plans to 
put out a request for public comments on the potential costs of 
implementing a uniform fiduciary standard,80 after which the  
 
 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 125; see also NASD Rule IM-2210-6, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=362
3 (superseded by FINRA Rule 2214, available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10651). 
76 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 125. 
77 Id. 
78 Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11. 
79 See Joshua Horn, Broker-Dealers May End Up with ‘Hybrid’ Fiduciary 
Standard, THOMSON REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomson 
reuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/09_-_September/Broker-dealers_may_end_up_wi 
th_%E2%80%98hybrid%E2%80%99_fiduciary_standard/. 
80 Hamilton & Collins, supra note 11. 
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SEC would issue a proposal, again seeking public comment.81  It 
is estimated that even if this process begins today, the process 
could continue into 2013.82 
III. THE POSITIONS OF INTERESTED INDUSTRY GROUPS 
A. SIFMA’s Position 
SIFMA submitted a letter dated July 14, 2011 (the “SIFMA 
Letter”) to the SEC stating its support for the development of a 
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment 
advice to retail customers, and offering a proposed framework 
and principles for rulemaking under section 213.83  While SIFMA 
supports the development of a uniform fiduciary standard, it 
opposes efforts by the SEC to simply impose on broker-dealers 
the fiduciary obligations of investment advisers under the 
Advisers Act and related case law and regulations.84  SIFMA 
asserts that the broker-dealer business model, with its broad 
array of product and service offerings, is fundamentally different 
than the investment adviser model and that the “general 
fiduciary duty implied under section 206 of the Advisers Act, as 
developed through case law, guidance and other legal 
precedent, . . . provides incompatible and insufficient guidance 
for broker-dealers on how to manage, disclose, or obtain consents 
to these conflicts.”85 
The SIFMA Letter explains how an extension of the case 
law, guidance, and other precedent under the Advisers Act would 
lead to undesired effects for both broker-dealers and investors.  
In particular, SIFMA explains that it would adversely impact 
choice, product access, and affordability of customer services.86  It 
would also upend the existing supervisory and compliance regime 
of broker-dealers, thereby requiring massive investments in  
 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, 
SIFMA, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1–2 (July 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter SIFMA Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-
2952.pdf. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 Id. at 5. 
86 Id. at 14. 
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supervisory protocols, technology, and training that would make 
the proposal incompatible with the “business model neutral” 
approach espoused by the SEC in the Study. 
The SIFMA Letter further outlines a proposed framework 
and principles for the SEC to consider in promulgating rules 
establishing a uniform standard.87  As formulated by SIFMA, the 
uniform standard would begin with the core principle mandated 
by Dodd Frank—that all broker-dealers and investment advisers, 
when providing personalized advice about securities to 
customers, shall “act in the best interest of the customer without 
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or 
investment adviser providing the advice.”88  From there, SIFMA 
seeks a clear and detailed articulation of the scope of a broker-
dealer fiduciary obligation under a uniform standard.89  For 
example, SIFMA suggests that the standard of conduct should 
commence when the customer agreement is signed and should 
not apply to discussions about the “nature of the relationship.”90  
Broker-dealers should also be permitted to shape the standard of 
conduct in the customer agreement and have the standard 
applied on an account-by-account basis.91  SIFMA also seeks 
explicit rulemaking that traditional forms of broker-dealer 
products, sales, or compensation arrangements—including 
commissions, revenue sharing, distribution fees on mutual 
funds—are not violative of the uniform standard of conduct.92  
SIFMA seeks clear guidance from the rulemaking process that 
such language does require broker-dealers to run a completely 
conflict-free business93—specifically, language permitting 
transaction-based compensation.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 Id. at 15. 
88 Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 See id. at 16. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. at 16–17. 
92 Id. at 17. 
93 See id. at 18. 
94 See id. at 17. 
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In a similar vein, SIFMA seeks clear guidance from the SEC 
on what business conduct constitutes personalized investment 
advice about securities.95  SIFMA’s suggested governing 
principles are drawn largely from the Study’s analysis of what 
constitutes “personalized investment advice.”96 
Finally, SIFMA proposes that the SEC provide clear 
guidance on what disclosures would satisfy the uniform fiduciary 
standard of conduct.97 
B. The Consumer Federation of America (“CFA”) Letter 
On March 28, 2012, a coalition of organizations and groups—
the Consumer Federation of America, the Fund Democracy, 
AARP, the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., 
Financial Planning Association, Investment Adviser Association, 
and National Association of Personal Financial Advisors—issued 
a letter (the “CFA Letter”) strongly supporting the extension of 
the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act to all broker-dealers 
when they offer personalized investment advice, and responding 
to the framework proposed by SIFMA.98 
In contrast to the SIFMA Letter, the CFA Letter advocates 
that the new uniform fiduciary standard should extend the 
existing Advisers Act standard, which currently applies to 
investment advisers, to broker-dealers while “clarifying its 
applicability in the context of broker-dealer conduct.”99  The CFA 
Letter suggests that the imposition of a uniform fiduciary 
standard on broker-dealers would not have the “catastrophic 
consequences” envisioned by SIFMA.100  In particular, the CFA 
Letter concedes that Dodd-Frank permits broker-dealers to 
charge commissions, offer transaction-based recommendations, 
and sell proprietary products without any of these activities 
being violative of the fiduciary duty.101 
 
 
95 Id. at 18. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. at 20. 
98 CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
99 Id. at 2. 
100 Id. at 1–2. 
101 Id. at 3; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012)). 
FINAL_MELNICK 2/27/2014  6:22 PM 
432 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:415   
Moreover, the CFA Letter agrees that “the fiduciary duty 
should permit advice regarding a discrete transaction without 
necessarily triggering a continuing duty of care.”102  However, the 
CFA Letter opposes SIFMA’s proposal that a “continuing duty of 
care” be exclusively addressed by the written customer 
agreement.103  The CFA Letter further notes that while section 
913 allows for significant changes to current broker-dealer duties 
in the provision of investment advice,104 the section rejects the 
imposition of an ongoing fiduciary duty, stating,  “Nothing in this 
section shall require a broker or dealer or registered 
representative to have a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the 
customer after providing personalized investment advice about 
securities.”105  The CFA Letter posits that whether a continuing 
duty of care exists should be determined by the facts and 
circumstances of the particular broker-dealer’s relationship with 
the customer, and not the customer agreement.106 
Finally, while the CFA agrees with SIFMA that the SEC 
needs to define “personalized investment advice,”107 it advocates 
for a more general principles-based approach rather than a 
specific list of examples of conduct that would or would not 
constitute “personalized investment advice.”108  The CFA Letter 
agrees with SIFMA’s list of four items that should be included 
within “personalized investment advice” and would also include 
advice on a decision to not purchase or sell a security on the 
list.109  With respect to SIFMA’s fifteen items that should not be 
considered “personalized investment advice,”110 the CFA Letter 
agrees with some points on the list and disagrees with others.111 
 
 
102 CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 8. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. 
105 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 
Stat. at 1828. 
106 CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 9. 
107 Id. at 1. 
108 Id. at 11. 
109 Id. 
110 SIFMA Letter, supra note 83, at 19–20. 
111 CFA Letter, supra note 14, at 12–14. 
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IV. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
It appears likely that, absent a change in the administration, 
the SEC will be promulgating rules announcing a uniform 
fiduciary standard covering broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.112  The SEC’s challenge under Dodd-Frank is to shape 
the rules in such a way as to provide for enhanced investor 
protection and education, while not causing wholesale changes in 
the existing broker-dealer model or exposing broker-dealers to 
substantial litigation and regulatory exposure.113 
There are several areas in particular where the SEC would 
do well to provide clear and explicit guidance.  First, the SEC’s 
rules should include an express acknowledgment that the receipt 
of a commission does not create a violation of the proposed 
fiduciary standard in and of itself.114  While Dodd-Frank provides 
for this,115 clarification in the SEC’s rules would be highly 
beneficial.  And then, perhaps the SEC can go a step further and, 
as guidance, make clear that, while compensation can be a factor 
in determining whether a broker-dealer acted in the best interest 
of its clients, it cannot and should not be the sole determinative 
factor.  Without such clarification, in the litigation, arbitration, 
and regulatory enforcement process, broker-dealers and 
associated persons might be vulnerable to arguments that the 
“best interests” of their client were not served by putting the 
client in a particular product, account, or strategy when there 
was a lower-cost alternative available.116  Given the wide range of 
securities and products, firms and registered representatives  
 
 
112 Two of the five SEC commissioners dissented from the SEC Staff Study, 
citing an insufficient analytical or empirical basis for the recommendations made in 
the study. Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and 
Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch012211klctap.htm. 
113 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Remarks, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture, 
Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd-Frank Help, or Hurt?, 
72 LA. L. REV. 591, 597 (2012). 
114 SIFMA Letter, supra note 83, at 9 n.16. 
115 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012)). 
116 Cf. Davantzis v. PaineWebber Inc., No. 20032/2000, 2001 WL 1423519, at 
*1–2 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. July 21, 2001) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty 
claim alleging that defendant broker-dealer failed to put plaintiff in least expensive 
account structure). 
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should be allowed sufficient flexibility to recommend products 
and services based on multiple factors including, but not limited 
to, cost to the investor. 
Perhaps more importantly, the SEC would be wise to provide 
precise rules and guidance establishing that there is no ongoing 
duty to provide advice between transactions unless specifically 
agreed to.117  While section 913 of Dodd-Frank does not “require a 
broker or dealer or registered representative to have a continuing 
duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing 
personalized investment advice about securities,”118 the SEC 
should make clear that the final rules do not include or imply 
such a duty.  Generally, a broker in a nondiscretionary account 
does not have a fiduciary duty to its client119 and, more 
specifically, does not have a duty to monitor the client’s accounts 
between transactions.120  That fundamental principle lies at the 
heart of the broker-dealer model and the relationship between 
client and registered representatives.121  The suitability rule that 
governs broker-dealers’ conduct with their customers has 
traditionally been transaction-based.122  The new suitability rules 
that recently became effective expand the concept by discussing 
suitability in terms of specific recommended trades and  
 
 
 
117 Under New York law, a party to a contract—whether a fiduciary or 
otherwise—cannot be held liable for failing to perform duties beyond the scope of 
those required in the governing contract. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. 
Remington Prods., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary 
judgment and rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claim where such claim was based 
on duties beyond the scope of relevant contract), aff’d, 71 F.3d 407 (2d Cir. 1995); see 
also BNY Capital Mkts., Inc. v. Moltech Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11754(GEL), 2001 WL 
262675, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2001) (stating that a fiduciary is only responsible 
for “matters within the scope of the relation”); Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 
319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim where limited 
partnership agreement, not common law fiduciary principles, outlined governance 
process over setting and approving terms of transactions). The SEC should provide 
firms with the flexibility to clarify the scope of the customer agreement. 
118 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 
Stat. at 1828. 
119 See Unreported Cases, O’Malley v. Boris, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1189, 1189 
(1999). 
120 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
121 See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 719 (2010). 
122 See Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best 
Interests? The Road To Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 4344 (2009). 
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recommended strategies, as well as recommendations to hold a 
security;123 but, essentially, suitability remains a transaction-
based inquiry.124 
Currently, however, broker-dealers are simply not equipped 
to provide ongoing monitoring of their customers’ accounts and 
positions between specific trades.125  Indeed, a particular 
registered representative might have hundreds of accounts with 
hundreds of positions, some recommended, some unsolicited, and 
some transferred to the broker-dealer from other firms.126  
Imposing an ongoing duty of care and loyalty between 
transactions would require a wholesale change to broker-dealers’ 
technology and systems, from client intake and “know your 
customer” to portfolio monitoring and reporting systems.  It also 
would fundamentally alter the relationship between registered 
representative and broker-dealer and customer and potentially 
lead to substantially increased exposure for broker-dealers in the 
litigation, arbitration, and regulatory contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the SEC Staff Study and the various positions 
espoused by industry organizations and academics, it appears 
likely that a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to broker-
dealers and investment advisers will be announced and 
implemented in the future.  The impact on broker-dealers will 
depend on the details of the actual rules.  If there is a wholesale 
grafting of the Advisers Act’s fiduciary regime onto the rules 
governing broker-dealers, the uniform fiduciary standard will 
likely have a significant impact on how broker-dealers structure 
their relationships with their customers and on their potential 
legal exposure.  If the rules are sufficiently flexible to account for 
the broker-dealer business model, the standard will enhance 
investor protection and education and reduce investor confusion, 
while maintaining the products and services investors currently 
enjoy from broker-dealers. 
 
123 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25: Know Your Customer and Suitablity 2 
(2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/ 
documents/notices/p123701.pdf. 
124 See id. at 2. 
125 See Gary A. Varnavides, Note, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation 
and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 203 (2011). 
126 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 8–11. 
